























 The recent economics literature has focused on establishing a general debt-to-GDP 
threshold across countries where output growth becomes negatively affected.  This paper, 
conversely, attempts to establish debt-to-GDP thresholds for individual countries, the purpose of 
which is to show that a country’s fiscal policy decisions should be based on data specific to that 
country, which should foster more informed and prudent policy making.   
 
Introduction  
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis economists began conducting a postmortem, 
asking questions such as: how did this happen, how could it have been prevented, and how can 
we recover from it as quickly as possible?  This paper is concerned with the lattermost question, 
but even more specifically, the question of what effect does the level of public debt have on GDP 
growth?  Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), in their paper “Growth in a Time of Debt,” were the first 
to broach this question following 2008.  They asserted that when a country’s public debt reaches 
a 90 percent debt-to-GDP threshold, GDP growth slows.  Their findings had far reaching 
consequences, and prompted many Eurozone governments, such as France, Austria, Germany, 
Italy, Greece, and the United Kingdom, to enact budget austerity measures in an effort to avoid 
the 90 percent threshold.   
This paper reviews some of the theoretical and empirical economics literature on this 
topic, and unlike Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), who establish a general debt threshold for all 
countries, this paper establishes debt thresholds for individual countries through threshold 
regression analysis, and supports the theory proposed by Chudik et al. (2015) that debt trajectory, 
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not the level of debt, is what affects GDP growth.  Ultimately, the threshold found by Reinhart 
and Rogoff will be rejected as a basis for government fiscal policy decisions, as it is based on 
general data when country-specific data is needed. 
 
Review of the Literature  
During recessions, governments go into debt to finance spending that boosts aggregate 
demand and output in the short run, averting the disasters of a potentially deeper and longer 
recession (Mankiw and Elmendorf, 1999, p. 18).  In the short run, wages and prices are sticky so 
increases in aggregate demand (achieved through increases in government expenditure) boost 
national income.  The downside of public debt is manifest in the long run where classical 
economic assumptions hold and wages and prices are no longer sticky.  A decrease in 
government savings (i.e. an increase in government debt) is assumed to not be matched by an 
equal increase in private savings, which in turn drives up demand for money in the loanable 
funds market, thereby raising the interest rate.  A higher interest rate ultimately results in a 
decrease in investment and a subsequent decrease in capital stock, which lowers the marginal 
product of labor and thereby lowers wages and income (Mankiw and Elmendorf, 1999, pp. 18-
20).   
“Growth in a Time of Debt” by Reinhart and Rogoff (hereinafter R &R) addresses the 
negative impacts of government debt that are evident in the long run (R & R, 2010).  R & R 
(2010) believe that there is a debt-to-GDP threshold where GDP growth is sharply and 
negatively affected, and they purport that threshold to be 90 percent.  To find this threshold, R & 
R (2010) studied twenty advanced economies over the period 1946-2009 and exogenously 
imposed four levels of thresholds in order to group countries according to their levels of debt.  
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The four thresholds were 1) below 30 percent, 2) between 30 and 60 percent, 3) between 60 and 
90 percent, and 4) above 90 percent.  The countries with debt-to-GDP levels in excess of 90 
percent had median growth rates about 1 percent lower than countries at the other threshold 
levels.  This simple statistical analysis led R & R (2010) to believe that once countries reach a 90 
percent debt-to-GDP ratio their economic growth is severely impacted.  Their paper provided the 
rationale for subsequent austerity measures initiated throughout the Eurozone, as countries such 
as Great Britain and Greece made drastic cuts in government expenditures to avoid the 90 
percent threshold.   
Many papers were published in response to R & R’s, either supporting, questioning, or 
rejecting their conclusions.  Fortunately, Panizza and Presbitero published a survey of the “recent 
literature on the links between public debt and economic growth in advanced economies” (i.e. 
papers that addressed R & R’s findings, either directly or indirectly) (Panizza & Presbitero, 
2012, p. 1).  The main conclusion that Panizza and Presbitero found throughout the literature is 
embodied in this statement by the International Monetary Fund: “There is no simple relationship 
between debt and growth . . . There are many factors that matter for a country’s growth and debt 
performance.  Moreover, there is no single threshold for debt ratios that can delineate the ‘bad’ 
from the ‘good’” (Panizza and Presbitero, 2012, p. 1).  In other words, R & R oversimplified the 
relationship between debt and GDP growth, and it is not possible to apply a single, general 
threshold to individual countries.  The critical problem in R & R’s oversimplification is their 
exogenously imposed thresholds.  An ideal model would establish thresholds endogenously, 
which would provide a more accurate measure of how public debt affects GDP growth.   
Minea and Parent (2012) delve deeper into R & R’s contention that a universally 
applicable 90 percent debt-to-GDP threshold exists across developed countries, and argue that, in 
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fact, no such universally applicable threshold exists.  Minea and Parent (2012) use cutting edge 
econometrics, a Panel Smooth Threshold Regression model, and find that, on average, countries 
with debt levels between 90 and 115 percent grow slower than those with lower debt levels.  
However, countries with debt levels in excess of 115 percent actually exhibit a positive 
relationship between debt and growth (Minea & Parent, 2012).  The authors emphasize that this 
is not an excuse for countries to run profligate fiscal policies, rather, it simply illustrates that the 
relationship between debt and growth is subject to complex nonlinearities and therefore making 
policy decisions according to a universal threshold is unwarranted.  Indeed, Panizza and 
Presbitero agree, saying that “the conventional interpretation of the presence of a debt threshold, 
which is generally used to argue that if a country raises its public debt-to-GDP ratio above 90 
percent, GDP growth will decline” is a “fallacy” (Panizza and Presbitero, 2012, p. 18). 
Chudik et al. (2015) advance the most compelling hypothesis about the effects of debt 
levels on GDP growth.  They argue that the complexity of the relationship between debt and 
growth makes any attempt to establish a one-way, causal, non-linear effect between the two 
difficult, and any claim that does attempt to establish such a relationship is unconvincing.  
Instead, the authors contend that the trajectory of public debt is what has significant negative 
long run effects on growth.  Foundational to their argument is the observation that “cross-country 
experience shows that some economies have run into debt difficulties and experienced subdued 
growth at relatively low debt levels, while others have been able to sustain high levels of 
indebtedness for prolonged periods and grow strongly without experiencing debt distress,” which 
leads us to conclude that the effect of debt on growth varies from country to country (Chudik et 
al., 2015, p. 4).  While not criticizing R & R directly, Chudik et al. point out problems with their 
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study, namely that their results are based on “strong homogeneity assumptions” and have also 
ignored reverse causal effects from GDP growth to debt (Chudik et al., 2015, p. 4).   
One of the more pertinent findings by Chudik et al. (2015) is that short run deficits are 
acceptable and in the long run markets’ and consumers’ expectations are what matter.  This 
parallels the conventional wisdom that a temporary increase in government expenditures during 
recessions is necessary to avoid hysteresis, or the “echo” of the recession into the future, which 
negatively impacts growth even after the recession is over.  Indeed, if the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
raised temporarily to “help smooth out business cycle fluctuations,” Chudik et al. find no long 
run negative impact on growth (Chudik et al., 2015, p. 6).   
 
Method  
 I perform a threshold regression according to the following equation, for each country 
individually:  
Δy = (α0 + α1n + α2π + α3yt-1) i(d ≥ γ) + (β0 + β1n + β2π + β3yt-1) i(d < γ) + et 
 
The threshold variable, d, is debt-to-GDP ratio, the dependent variable is annual real GDP 
growth per capita, Δy, and gamma, γ, is the endogenous threshold parameter.  The independent 
variables are population (n), inflation (π) based on CPI, and GDP growth lagged one period (yt-1).  
The annual data is from Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010) data set used in their paper “Growth in a 
Time of Debt.”  Observations for each variable extend as far back as 1861, resulting in more than 
one hundred observations for each country, even when gaps in the data are accounted for.  The 
countries analyzed are Australia (observations from 1862-2008), Canada (1871-2008), Chile 
(1862-2008), France (1862-2008), Germany (1862-2008), Greece (1914-2008), Italy (1862-
2008), New Zealand (1871-2008), the United Kingdom (1862-2008), and the United States 
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(1871-2008).  These countries were used because many of them enacted budget austerity 
measures, as mentioned in the introduction, and because they are the world’s leading economies 
so enough data is available on each country to populate the model.   
 
Preview of Results 
 Within the sample, statistically significant thresholds were found for France, Greece, 
Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States.  The regression results for these countries are 
included below, as well as two graphs of each country’s debt levels over time; one graphs debt 
over the past century and a half, while the other graphs debt over the past three decades.  The 
purpose of including the graphs is to investigate Chudik et al.’s (2015) claim that debt trajectory 
matters when establishing a statistically significant debt threshold.  
 Statistically significant thresholds were not found for Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, 
and New Zealand.  Therefore, their regression results are not included.  Graphs of debt over time, 
exactly like the ones listed in the preceding paragraph, are included to support the other side of 
Chudik et al.’s claim.  To explain, if Chudik et al.’s finding hold then countries without 
significant debt thresholds should have debt levels that are either falling, or low.  For clarity, the 
results are broken up into two sections, Results A and Results B.  The countries with significant 
debt thresholds are in Results A, the others are in Results B.  A discussion of the results follows 
each section, which is then followed by a discussion of both sections together along with a brief 
policy discussion. 
 
[[results A inserted here]] 
Discussion of Results A 
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 For France, the model found a threshold at a debt-to-GDP ratio of 80 percent (Figure 1).  
The coefficient for debt is significant at the 99 percent confidence interval.  What is interesting, 
however, is that debt is actually positively associated with growth.  France is the only country in 
this sample that the model assigns a positive debt coefficient.  This is certainly unexpected, but 
should be interpreted as Minea & Parent (2012) interpreted their unexpected results: countries 
should not take what the model returns as infallible, and therefore France should not run 
profligate fiscal policies.  
For Greece, the United Kingdom, and the United Sates, the model found debt thresholds 
significant at 99 percent confidence, but unlike France, debt was negatively associated with GDP 
growth.  The highest thresholds for the three countries were 103, 156, and 63 percent for Greece, 
the UK, and the US, respectively (Figure 2, 4, and 5).  The model returned three threshold levels 
for each country, and for Greece and the United States, the second threshold level was also 
statistically significant, but only Greece’s second threshold was negatively associated with GDP 
growth; which means that debt becomes negatively associated with GDP growth for Greece at a 
threshold of 65 percent.  Additionally, Italy’s debt-to-GDP threshold was established at 47 
percent at 90 percent confidence (Figure 3). 
These results closely mirror the hypothesis of Chudik et al.  Reviewing the graphs of debt 
for all five countries, their debt levels consistently and steadily increase for at least several 
decades prior to 2010, with the United Kingdom being the only exception (Figure 1.2, 2.2, 3.2, 
and 5.2).  That said, the United Kingdom’s debt does increase steadily all throughout the 
previous decade, with a dramatic spike occurring in 2008 (Figure 4.2).  These results give strong 
credence to the hypothesis advanced by Chudik et al. (2015), that debt trajectory matters in 




[[insert results b]] 
Discussion of Results B 
 Because no statistically significant debt thresholds were found for these countries, their 
regression results were not included.  However, the graphs that track debt levels are pertinent to 
addressing Chudik et al.’s (2015) findings and therefore were included.  Australia, Canada, Chile 
and New Zealand all have either falling levels of debt, or have maintained low levels of debt for 
the past century and a half (Figure 6, 7, 8, and 10).  The only exception is Germany, as debt 
levels for Germany are steadily increasing over time (Figure 9).  There are several reasons why 
this could be: first, the data on Germany’s public debt levels is very sparse, and there are several 
large gaps within the last one hundred and fifty years where no debt-to-GDP ratio is given.  The 
model probably did not have enough observations to establish a significant threshold.  Second, 
while Germany’s debt level is increasing, it is still relatively low compared to the other countries 
in this sample.  Indeed, countries in Section A had to reach a debt-to-GDP ratio of at least 60 
percent before a significant threshold was determined, and Germany has yet to reach a 50 percent 
debt-to-GDP threshold.  
 In contrast to the countries in section A, the countries in section B did not have 
statistically significant debt thresholds.  However, these results still strongly support the findings 
of Chudik et al.  Indeed, according to Chudik et al. (2015) we would expect that debt in countries 
with low, or falling, levels of debt would not affect GDP growth negatively, and this is exactly 
what the model finds to be the case for Australia, Canada, Chile, New Zealand, and Germany. 
 
Discussion of Results A and B and Policy Implications 
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 These results differ from most of the current literature because they are generated for 
individual countries, based on data specific to that country.  This is critical because the austerity 
measures adopted by Eurozone countries in response to the 2008 crisis and R & R’s paper did 
not consider country-specific data, and as a result, budget cuts were implemented in haste which 
probably had negative economic effects.  That is, conventional economic theory as outlined by 
Douglas and Mankiw (1999), says that increases in government expenditures can help mitigate 
the damages of a recession.  The exact opposite of this, budget cuts, has contractionary effects, 
which is highly counterproductive during a recession. 
No statistically significant thresholds were found for countries with low levels of debt or 
falling levels of debt, which is in lockstep with Chudik et al.’s (2015) findings.  Furthermore, 
countries with rising levels of debt for at least the previous decade had statistically significant 
debt-to-GDP thresholds, where GDP growth becomes adversely affected.  It is therefore very 
important for future governments, when contemplating whether to implement austerity measures, 
to consider whether their debt is on a downward trajectory, or has yet to reach detrimental levels.  
If either of these conditions hold, then austerity measures are unwarranted.  If debt is on an 
upward trajectory, or has reached a high debt-to-GDP level, panic is ill-advised and the most 
prudent course of action is to lower debt levels gradually, restoring the confidence of markets’, 
consumers’, and foreign governments’ in the country’s central government. 
 Governments must consider the monetary environment when borrowing to pay for 
government expenditures.  The 2008 financial crisis presented an economic situation that we had 
never seen before: the Federal Reserve made prolonged efforts to remain at the zero lower bound 
(ZLB), keeping interest rates at zero from 2009 to the end of 2015.  At the ZLB, government 
spending multipliers are greater than in “normal” times (Delong and Summers, 2012).  This is 
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because demand in the loanable funds market is very slack, so an increase in government 
spending does not cause a rise in interest rates and therefore the crowding out effect is avoided.  
Therefore, if there ever is a time to borrow and increase government spending, it is at the zero 
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